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An Empirical Examination of the Impact of
College Financial Aid on Family Savings
Abstract - The system of distributing ﬁnancial aid dollars using
needs analysis formulae implicitly imposes a ﬁnancial aid tax on
assets. Existing studies provide mixed evidence of the inﬂuence
of this implicit tax on assets on wealth accumulation. This paper
attempts to contribute to the literature on this topic by examining
the sensitivity of results to various assumptions, speciﬁcations,
and categories of assets, using more recent data that allows for the
incorporation of recent developments in ﬁnancial aid and college
costs. I ﬁnd much weaker evidence than existing studies that college
ﬁnancial aid has a signiﬁcant impact on family savings.
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ost colleges and universities in the United States adjust
the prices they charge some of their students based on
their ability to pay. Middle and lower income families are
often eligible for and receive ﬁnancial aid from federal and
institutional sources for their educational expenses. Needs
analysis is the mechanism for determining eligibility for ﬁnancial aid dollars and the amount of award one will receive.
Needs analysis formulae attempt to ascertain a family’s—
usually both the student and his or her parents—ability to
pay for higher education expenses. Detailed information on
the family’s income, assets, and familial composition are
provided by the family to the institution to which a student
is applying for ﬁnancial aid. Financial aid directors at the
institution use this information and apply needs analysis
formulae to the family’s ﬁnancial information to determine
how much a family should pay and thus how much ﬁnancial
aid they will receive.
The result is that families who save for their children’s
higher education expenses are deemed more able to pay
these expenses and therefore are charged more and receive
less ﬁnancial aid. Families who do not save as diligently will
be expected to contribute less to the educational expenses of
their children. As a result, the application of needs analysis
leads to a “tax” on family assets. Among families eligible for
ﬁnancial aid, those families with higher assets are charged
a higher price (and in some cases a higher percentage of
their assets) to attend a college or university. This system of
allocating ﬁnancial aid resources based on needs analysis
189
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aid at average–priced colleges and $15,000
in ﬁnancial aid at expensive colleges for
each additional $50,000 in assets. They
estimate that most families face an 8 to 26
percent marginal tax on savings. Again,
the focus is on the impact of the savings
on one’s ﬁnancial aid award, and not on
whether the reduction in the award inﬂuences savings.
These sometimes rather substantial
taxes on assets may act as a signiﬁcant
deterrent to the accumulation of assets.
In fact, Feldstein (1995), using data from
the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances,
found that ﬁnancial aid taxes on assets
have a signiﬁcant adverse effect on the
accumulation of financial wealth. His
equation of the impact of ﬁnancial aid on
family savings was:

and a family’s ability to pay presents a
tax on assets and a savings disincentive
for middle and lower–income families,
by penalizing students and families who
prudently save for higher education by
reducing their ﬁnancial aid awards.
Case and McPherson (1986) and more
recently Edlin (1993) meticulously calculate the theoretical ﬁnancial aid tax on assets faced by families who are candidates
for ﬁnancial aid. Edlin (1993) illustrates
that while the maximum ﬁnancial aid tax
on assets in any single year is only 5.64
percent, families who face a number of
years of ﬁnancial aid taxes may confront
much higher cumulative tax rates on savings.1 For example, he ﬁnds that families
who have children in college for a total of
12 years have an effective tax on assets of
approximately 57 percent (see Appendix
B for a discussion of Edlin’s calculation of
the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets).2 While the
assumed interest rate earned on savings
may signiﬁcantly lower this ﬁnancial aid
tax rate (because both income and assets
are taxed under the ﬁnancial aid rules),
even a zero nominal interest rate on savings leads to a 44 percent ﬁnancial aid
tax on assets for a family facing 12 years
of ﬁnancial aid taxes. Even a family with
one child enrolled for 4 years faces a 21
percent tax on assets (again assuming zero
nominal interest earned on those assets).
Edlin’s (1993) focus in on estimating the
ﬁnancial aid tax rate that families may
face under alternative scenarios. He does
not attempt to estimate whether families’
savings are affected by this tax on their
assets.
In a related study, Dick and Edlin (1997)
empirically investigate the impact of additional assets on a student’s ﬁnancial
aid award. They ﬁnd that a typical family
loses approximately $11,000 in ﬁnancial
1

2

[1] Ai = b0 + (b1 + b2(tax)i + b3(age)i
+ b4(# children)i)*incomei + εi ,
where A are family net ﬁnancial assets,
tax is the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets, age is
the age of the older parent, # of children are
the number of children under the age of 18
living at home, income is parental income,
and ε represents the family speciﬁc error
term for the ith family. Feldstein uses two
stage estimation to ﬁrst estimate predicted
assets based on a quadratic in income, and
then calculates a family’s ﬁnancial aid
tax based on their income and predicted
assets (see Appendix B for details of Feldstein’s ﬁnancial aid tax calculation). As a
result, his system of equations is identiﬁed
based on non–linearity in the relationship
between income, assets, and the ﬁnancial
aid tax. In addition, his calculation of the
ﬁnancial aid tax ignores the important
interaction of the ﬁnancial aid tax with
the federal and state tax rates, and with

This calculation and all subsequent calculations and discussion concern the ﬁnancial aid tax on parent’s assets.
The ﬁnancial aid tax on the student’s assets is much higher, at 35 percent a year.
This ﬁnancial aid tax rate assumes an 8 percent state tax rate, a marginal federal tax rate of 28 percent, and a
ﬁnancial aid tax on income of 47 percent under the Congressional Methodology in place in 1992. See Edlin
(1993) for complete details of the calculation and assumptions.
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income and asset protection allowances
face zero marginal financial aid taxes.
Similarly, families whose income and assets are high enough that their expected
family contribution (EFC) exceeds the
cost of attendance at their institution also
face zero ﬁnancial aid taxes as they are
ineligible for ﬁnancial aid. Third, Edlin
(1993) and Feldstein (1995) assume that
all ﬁnancial need, the gap between the
cost of attendance and a family’s EFC, is
met. Dick and Edlin (1997) point out that
is often not the case as many institutions
cannot afford to meet the full ﬁnancial
need of all of their students. Fourth, the
effective marginal tax on savings was reduced with the 1992 Higher Education Reauthorization Act, when home equity was
excluded from the federal needs analysis
formula. In practice, a small, but increasing, number of private institutions now
eliminate or reduce a family’s assets held
as home equity in determining eligibility
for institutional grant aid. Additionally,
a signiﬁcant portion of family assets is
often held in the form of retirement assets.
The market value of retirement assets is
often difﬁcult to determine, and they are
normally excluded from the asset base in
determining ﬁnancial aid.
Using the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Survey of 1992–93, Kane
(1998) examines the net worth of families
with undergraduate students. If families
were acting strategically and reducing
their asset holdings in response to college
ﬁnancial aid rules, then one would expect
to see a “stacking up” of family assets
at the asset protection allowance levels.
Kane (1998) does not ﬁnd any evidence of
family net worth clustering just below the
asset protection allowance levels.
In addition, the growing popularity of
state sponsored pre–paid tuition plans
also seem to provide prima facie evidence
that families’ savings are not adversely
affected by ﬁnancial aid taxes. By the fall
of 1999, 21 states had pre–paid tuition
plans. By far the most popular state plan

the assumptions surrounding the mix
of loans versus grant aid in the ﬁnancial
aid package. Using this speciﬁcation, he
estimates that a family of four, with two
children, income of $40,000 (in 1986 dollars), and a family head aged 45, would
have saved approximately $45,266 in the
absence of the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets.
Because of the high ﬁnancial aid tax rates
on savings, he predicts this same family
would only save $22,142.
In a study that is similar in approach
to Feldstein’s (1995) IV estimation, Kim
(1999) ﬁnds comparable savings reductions as a result of college ﬁnancial aid
rules. Kim (1999) uses child–spacing and
the state–speciﬁc average annual costs of
four–year private, four–year public, and
two–year public college to identify the
ﬁnancial aid tax separately from the asset
equation. The strategy behind this identiﬁcation approach is that two families with
the same number of children and same
amount of assets may face substantially
different tax rates depending on the spacing of their children. Additionally, the
identiﬁcation strategy assumes in–state
college tuition only affects family savings
through its impact on the ﬁnancial aid
tax on assets, and not on family savings
directly. Using data from the 1984 through
1992 Survey of Income and Program
Participation, Kim (1999) estimates that
family asset accumulation is reduced by
40 to 55 percent. These estimates suggest
that there is a huge impact of college ﬁnancial aid rules on the savings behavior
of ﬁnancial aid eligible families.
On the other hand, Kane (1998) points
out that the rather high ﬁnancial aid taxes
calculated by Edlin (1993) are reduced for
at least four reasons. First, only parental
assets above an asset protection allowance, or threshold level, are included in
needs analysis and subject to the ﬁnancial
aid tax. Second, college ﬁnancial aid taxes
are effectively zero for extremely low– and
extremely high–income families. Families
whose income and assets fall below the
191
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cial aid tax rates, using the 1986–87 and
1995–96 NPSAS data. They then use these
actual ﬁnancial aid tax rates to simulate
the family savings and enrollment choices
that families would have made under different ﬁnancial aid rule scenarios. They
estimate that families would have saved
approximately $4,000 to $5,000 more per
household under alternative ﬁnancial aid
regimes that do not explicitly tax family
savings. In particular, they estimate that
moving from a ﬁnancial aid system that
meets full need to no ﬁnancial aid system
at all would increase family savings by 29
percent among families with college aged
children, versus Feldstein who estimated
an increase in savings of 50 percent under
this scenario. Dick et al. (2002) further
point out that their estimate understates
the magnitude of the difference between
their result and Feldstein’s because their
simulation represents the reduction in
savings for families who face the ﬁnancial
aid tax with certainty versus Feldstein’s
(1995) estimate which includes many
families who will not even send their
children to college.
The evidence provided by Long (2004)
and Kane (1998) suggests that ﬁnancial
aid taxes do not provide signiﬁcant savings disincentives. On the other hand,
the huge effects found in the studies by
Feldstein (1995) and Kim (1999) imply
that families do indeed reduce their savings in anticipation of ﬁnancial aid, while
the results of Dick et al. lie in the middle
ground with ﬁnancial aid rules reducing
family savings but by signiﬁcantly less
than estimated by Feldstein (1995) and
Kim (1999). This study will attempt to
contribute to the discussion by examining the savings behavior of families
with pre–college aged children. The
primary difference between this study
and the existing empirical work is that
I carefully select the sample to include
only those families with the most consistent treatment of family income and
assets within the needs analysis formu-

is in Florida with over 500,000 enrollees
and over $3.5 billion is assets (Jennings
and Olivas, 2000, p. 18). The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 required that
state pre–paid tuition accounts be treated
as “other ﬁnancial assistance,” and, thus,
carry an implicit 100 percent tax on the
accumulated value of the plan. While
a student whose parents have $10,000
in ﬁnancial assets may lose up to $564
per year in ﬁnancial aid (5.64 percent), a
student with $10,000 in prepaid tuition
loses aid dollar for dollar. This dollar for
dollar reduction in ﬁnancial aid for each
dollar of prepaid tuition represents a 100
percent tax on those assets. Despite this
high tax rate, many of these state pre–paid
tuition plans are extremely popular. While
there is little information concerning the
enrollees in these plans, it is probably safe
to assume that some portion of them may
be eligible for ﬁnancial aid.
Long (2004) estimates a system of seven
equations incorporating uncertainty about
the probability of attendance, college
costs, expected family contributions, future family income, student contributions,
and ultimately predicted family assets,
using the Survey of Income and Program
Participation for 1990 and 1993. Based
on various assumptions and predicted
values imbedded in the above estimates,
he produces seven different measures of
the ﬁnancial aid tax. With these different
tax rates, he estimates 14 different effects
of ﬁnancial aid on family savings and
ﬁnds mixed results. In general, he does
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that ﬁnancial
aid rules substantially reduce family savings. Additionally, his results illustrate
the sensitivity of these types of studies
to the underlying assumptions that are
necessary to carry out the tests of the
relationship between ﬁnancial aid taxes
and family savings.
Finally, Dick et al. (2002) take a different
approach and use realized ﬁnancial aid tax
rates based on actual ﬁnancial aid awards,
rather than estimated or expected ﬁnan192
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lae.3 Because family income, and not assets, is a more signiﬁcant determinant of
expected family contribution, I carefully
construct a sample of families that are as
homogeneous as possible in their needs
analysis treatment, particularly with regards to non–custodial parental income.
Additionally, the data set I use, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997,
utilizes more recent data than existing
studies. This may be important for two
reasons. First, the 1992 Higher Education
Reauthorization Act made two substantial
changes to needs–analysis. One change
was the elimination of home equity
from the asset base in determining financial aid in the federal needs–analysis
methodology. This change substantially
reduced the assets subject to the ﬁnancial aid tax in determining eligibility for
federal funds for most families, not just
because it took home equity out of the
base, but also because the elimination of
home equity from the asset base dropped
the taxable net worth of many families
below the asset protection allowance
and thus reduced their financial aid
tax on assets to zero. The second change
produced by the 1992 Reauthorization
Act was the increase in the income threshold from $15,000 to $50,000 to qualify
for the Simpliﬁed Needs Test (SNT) in
determining ﬁnancial aid. Families with
less than $50,000 in income, who also
ﬁle a 1040EZ or 1040A tax form, do not
have their assets assessed in determining
ﬁnancial aid. This change in policy also
dropped the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets
to zero for many families. While Long
(2004) examines 1993 data in an attempt
to capture the inﬂuences of these changes
on family savings, it may have been too
short a time period to adjust assets and
savings behavior in response to these
changes. Later data may provide greater
insight into whether families responded
to these incentives.
3

The second reason that more recent data
may yield different results from earlier
studies is the escalating costs of attending college since the mid–1980s. From
academic year 1985 to 1997 average tuition and fees at public four–year colleges
increased by 61 percent, while average
tuition and fees at private four–year colleges increased by 56 percent, in real terms
(The College Board, 1998, p. 7). As tuition
costs grow relative to family income more
families become eligible for ﬁnancial aid.
Families that may not have faced a tax
on their assets when college costs were
lower may now face a substantial tax on
their assets.
Finally, although I attempt to replicate
the IV approach of Feldstein (1995), I also
test for and show the sensitivity of results
to various speciﬁcations of the regression
equation and across various forms of asset
holdings. In a ﬁnal test of the impact of
the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets I present reduced form estimates of the effect of child
spacing on family net worth. As Edlin
(1993) and Kim (1999) point out, the number of years that a family is subject to the
ﬁnancial aid tax is a greater component of
the total ﬁnancial aid tax than differences
in income or assets, for ﬁnancial aid eligible families. This approach does not rely
on any of the estimation and identiﬁcation
assumptions used in the previous studies by Feldstein (1995), Kim (1999), and
Long (2004). Because child spacing plays
such an important role in determining
the costs of attendance and the ﬁnancial
aid tax on assets for families eligible for
ﬁnancial aid, this reduced form regression
provides a test of the relationship between
the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets and family
savings. This test does, however, rely on
the assumption that child spacing is exogenous in determining family savings. This
assumption is tested using families who
are not eligible for ﬁnancial aid based on
their income.

See Appendix A for an outline of ﬁnancial aid needs analysis.
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sample of families, it is important to compare the income and asset variables from
the NLSY97 to nationally representative
data. Table 1 provides summary measures
of the households from the NLSY97 to
families from the Survey of Consumer
Finances of 1995 (SCF95). While the
NLSY97 is taken two years later than the
SCF95, this benchmarking suggests that
the households from the NLSY97 appear
to be comparable in terms of income and
assets to the SCF95.
I next attempt to pare the data set down
to those families that are likely to be eligible for ﬁnancial aid from at least some of
the colleges and universities in the United
States, and for whom the ﬁnancial aid
rules are most clear cut. Table 2 outlines

DATA
The data set used in this study is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997
(NLSY97). This is a national data set of 12 to
16 year–olds in 1997. This data set provides
a national sample of families with pre–college aged children. Both the child (or in
some cases more than one child in a family)
and the parents were interviewed. From the
parent survey one can garner information
on family income and asset levels, and age
of the parents. From the household screeners one can identify household composition
and child spacing.
Because the NLSY97 was designed to
survey youths aged 12 to 16, and does
not necessarily provide a representative

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF NLSY97 TO SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 1995
(all values are in thousands of nominal dollars)
NLSY97
SCF95
Before–tax family income
55.2a
48.3b
age of head 35–44
69.0a
64.8b
age of head 45–54
Family net worth
age of head 35–44
age of head 45-54

146.4
278.9

Financial assets as a percentage of total assets

35.6%

144.5
277.8
34.1%

1996 income
b
1994 income
a

TABLE 2
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH, 1997 COHORT SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
All individuals

9,022

Number of separate households identiﬁed

6,840

Less:
Not living with 2 biological parents

3,541

Household members (other than parents) who are older than 18

1,051

Household members under age 18 who are not full siblings

35

Self–employed and/or farmers

285

Older parent is younger than 40 or older than 50

752

Income less than zero or greater than $150,000

285

Non–reported household net worth (created variable) or net ﬁnancial assets greater
than $500,000

134

Selected households

757
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than $500,000 are also excluded from the
sample. The income threshold is used in
order to include those families who may
be eligible for financial aid, based on
income, from at least some of the most
expensive institutions in the country. This
threshold will be eliminated in one speciﬁcation to check the sensitivity of the results
to this income cut–off. The asset threshold
is used cautiously as one is hesitant to
select based upon the endogenous variable in an equation, but the excessively
high level of ﬁnancial assets relative to
income and the clear ineligibility of these
families for ﬁnancial aid warrants their
elimination. The remaining sample, used
in this study, contains 757 families. Table
3 contains summary measures for selected
variables from the ﬁnal sample.
Following the calculations of Edlin
(1993), the expected ﬁnancial aid tax on assets is calculated as the ratio of the return
on assets assuming no ﬁnancial aid tax on
assets to the return on assets incorporating
the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets.5 This calculation incorporates all of the marginal
taxes on savings, including the marginal
federal income tax rate, the state tax rate,
and the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets.6 Additionally, some assumptions concerning
a family’s estimated higher education
expenses are necessary. In estimating the
ﬁnancial aid tax on assets, I follow the
Feldstein (1995) approach and assume
that for families with expected estimated
family contributions (EFC) exceeding
$19,360 per concurrently enrolled child
(the average private, four–year tuition,
fees, room, and board for the 1997–98
academic year) or less than zero, the expected ﬁnancial aid tax rate is zero. If your
EFC, divided by the number of children

the exclusions made to the sample. For
example, from the 6,840 separate households identiﬁed in the NLSY97, 3,541 are
excluded because one of the children was
not living with both of his/her biological
parents. This may be important as the
treatment, in determining ﬁnancial aid
awards, of non–custodial parent’s income
and assets varies tremendously across
institutions. Additionally, another 1,051
families are eliminated from the sample
because there is a sibling or household
member over the age of 18 (other than
the parents). This excludes families with
college–aged children and/or other
adults who may either lay claim to the
educational resources of the family or
be able to provide additional resources.
An additional 35 families are excluded
because of the presence of a half–sibling
in the household, for reasons cited above.
The remaining families consist of full–siblings living with their two biological
parents. From this set of homogeneously
constructed families, families whose head
is self–employed and/or a farmer are excluded because their asset accumulation
behavior may be dramatically different
from non–self–employed heads of households. Similarly, only families whose older
parent is between the ages of 40 and 50
are included in the sample, in order to
avoid problems of properly specifying the
relationship between assets and the age of
the older parent. This is also the approach
followed by Feldstein (1995), and will thus
allow for easier comparison of results.4
Families who report income less than
zero or greater than $150,000 are excluded
from the sample. Similarly, families who
did not report household net worth, or
who reported net ﬁnancial assets greater
4

5
6

The following results are sensitive with respect to restrictions on the parent’s age. This is likely due to difﬁculty
in estimating the relationship between income and assets for different age groups. The limitations imposed
here minimize this problem.
See Appendix B for calculations of the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets.
The state income tax rate used is the average used by the Federal Methodology (FM) in calculating a family’s
available income. The assumed estimated state tax rate is 4 percent for family income less than or equal to
$15,000, and 3 percent for family income greater than $15,000 as used in the FM.
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TABLE 3
SELECTED VARIABLE SUMMARY MEASURES
Financial Aid Tax

Mean
17.9%

Feldstein Financial Aid Tax

28.8%

0.0%

Parental Income

$56,526

$0

$139,500

Net Financial Assets

$41,489

–$71,700

$460,500

Financial Assets

$45,039

$0

$460,500

Taxable Assets

$73,935

–$119,500

$1,242,500

$154,146

–$72,500

$2,145,137

Number of Children

2.2

1

8

Age of Older Parent

43.9

40

50

No. of Financial Aid Tax Years

6.9

0

20

Net Worth

Minimum
0.0%

–$750

Maximum
68.1%
86.0%

Family Contribution

$10,064

$43,747

Available Income

$22,985

–$29,965

$78,513

Adjusted Available Income

$27,235

–$29,965

$102,297

757
No. of Observations
Note: The ﬁnancial aid tax, family contribution, available income, and adjusted available income were all calculated using net ﬁnancial assets.

EFC up to $2,700 reduces grant aid from
the Pell program. For EFC greater than
$2,700, I assume that the financial aid
award is reduced in equal proportions of
loans and grants, and that loans account
for one–third of ﬁnancial aid above the
Pell award, and that student loans carry
a 50 percent subsidy value due to their
favorable terms.7
The Feldstein (1995) ﬁnancial aid tax
calculation varies from the ﬁnancial aid
tax used in this paper for a number of
reasons. First, Feldstein’s (1995) tax rate
does not account for the $50,000 income
threshold for the Simpliﬁed Needs Test,
as this was not in place in 1986 when he
estimated the impact of the tax on assets.
Second, his analysis does not account for
the interaction of federal and state taxes on
the ﬁnancial aid tax. Third, his calculation
assumes that all ﬁnancial aid is in the form

concurrently enrolled, is less than zero
or above the average cost of attendance,
then the accumulation of additional assets
does not affect your ﬁnancial aid award,
and therefore has a ﬁnancial aid tax of
zero. In estimating the ﬁnancial aid tax for
this paper, the ﬁnancial aid tax also goes
to zero if the individual qualiﬁes for the
Simpliﬁed Needs Test with family income
less than $50,000. It is also assumed that
all of a student’s need (the difference between the full sticker–price of attendance
minus the EFC) is met with ﬁnancial aid,
and some portion of ﬁnancial aid comes
in the form of loans. As an individual’s
eligibility for a Pell Grant declines dollar
for dollar with an increase in EFC, up to
the maximum of the Pell award ($2,700 in
1997), the impact of additional assets on
ﬁnancial aid varies across EFC levels. For
this analysis I assume that an increase in
7

Feldstein (1995) also assumes that all of a student’s need is met with ﬁnancial aid. He makes the additional
implicit assumption that the ﬁnancial aid is entirely grant aid and contains no loans.
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any ﬁnancial debt (excluding mortgage
debt); 3) taxable assets, which include all
of number 1 above, ﬁnancial assets, plus
home equity, less any retirement assets
(this is the asset base that is used by most
private college and universities); and 4)
net worth, which includes all assets of the
family less any debt.

of grants and not loans. Fourth, Feldstein
(1995) assumed that children were spaced
two years apart in age, where the actual
spacing in this data is closer to three years
apart. The end result is that the ﬁnancial
aid tax calculation used in this paper is
lower than the Feldstein (1995) replicated
tax rate applied to this data set.
Using the 1998–1999 federal methodology (FM) for determining the EFC and a
family’s expected eligibility for federally
sponsored ﬁnancial aid, I examine the
impact of the expected ﬁnancial aid tax
on family savings.8 Because the marginal
ﬁnancial aid tax rate on assets is a function
of assets, two–stage regression estimation
is used. In the ﬁrst stage, actual family
assets are regressed against income and
income–squared. The coefﬁcients from
this regression are used to estimate family assets. This ﬁtted value is then used
in the formula to determine the marginal
ﬁnancial aid tax. Similar to Kim (1999),
I use actual chronological spacing of
children to further identify the expected
ﬁnancial aid tax on assets. Child spacing
is assumed to be exogenous to the asset
accumulation equation and to inﬂuence
family savings only through its impact
on the ﬁnancial aid tax. This assumption
is tested later in the reduced form regressions of assets against child spacing for
those not eligible for ﬁnancial aid. In the
second–stage, family assets are regressed
against family income, number of children
in the family, the age of the older parent,
and the ﬁnancial aid tax rate on assets.
The effect of the ﬁnancial tax on family savings is tested using four different
measures of family wealth: 1) ﬁnancial
assets, which includes cash, stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, and other ﬁnancial
instruments; 2) net ﬁnancial assets, which
includes all of ﬁnancial assets above less
8

RESULTS
Table 4 presents the results of the second–stage regression estimation of the asset accumulation equation. For comparability, I specify the ﬁrst– and second–stage
regression equations in Table 4 to match
the speciﬁcation with the strongest results in the Feldstein (1995) paper. In this
table, assets are deﬁned as net ﬁnancial
assets. Speciﬁcation (1) presents the asset
accumulation equation and ﬁnancial aid
tax that most closely matches Feldstein’s
(1995) results. The accumulated assets
are an increasing function of income, age,
and number of children, and a decreasing
function of the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets. For example, for a family with a 44
year–old older parent, two children, and a
ﬁnancial aid tax on assets of 28.8 percent,
a dollar increase in income results in a
1.23 dollar increase in net ﬁnancial assets.
Additionally, evaluating the savings disincentives of the ﬁnancial aid tax for a family
with income of $56,500 (approximately the
mean in the sample) and the above characteristics results in a statistically signiﬁcant
reduction in ﬁnancial assets of $6,118. In
the absence of a ﬁnancial aid tax the above
family would be predicted to accumulate
$50,310 in net ﬁnancial assets, while accumulating only $44,192 as a result of the
ﬁnancial aid tax on assets.
Speciﬁcation (2) of Table 4 re–calculates
the ﬁnancial aid tax adjusting for actual

The Federal Methodology (FM) and the Institutional Methodology (IM), used by many private institutions
to calculate the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets, are quite comparable. The primary difference between the two
methodologies is the exclusion of home equity from the asset base in the FM, and its inclusion in the asset
base in the IM.
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TABLE 4
REPLICATION OF FELDSTEIN’S FINANCIAL AID RESULTS
Dependent Variable = Net Financial Assets
(1)
Intercept
–25,230.36***
(5,947.39)

(2)
–25,636.90***
(5,965.94)

(3)
–15,9689.56***
(40,999.52)

(4)
–1,728.77
(7,478.06)

–1.365**
(0.660)

–1.358**
(0.662)

1.277***
(0.094)

–2.122***
(0.702)

Income*Number of Children

0.097*
(0.051)

0.094*
(0.051)

–0.078
(0.080)

Income*Age of Older Parent

0.057***
(0.014)

0.055***
(0.014)

0.055***
(0.013)

Income*Financial Aid Tax

–0.376**
(0.185)

–0.293*
(0.168)

1.482**
(0.704)

Income

Number of Children

4,361.46
(2,782.70)

Age of Older Parent

2,876.08***
(886.11)

Financial Aid Tax

–21,744.26*
(11,268.64)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
Speciﬁcation (1): replication of Feldstein (1995) using NLSY97 data.
Speciﬁcation (2): Feldstein (1995) speciﬁcation with actual child spacing used in calculating the ﬁnancial aid
tax.
Speciﬁcation (3): actual child spacing and linear speciﬁcation.
Speciﬁcation (4): includes high income (>$150,000) families and eliminates EFC families cap in calculating the
ﬁnancial aid tax rate.

by Feldstein (1995), but using actual child
spacing, save $6,262 less than they otherwise would in the absence of this tax.
In a ﬁnal check of the sensitivity of the
results to the speciﬁcation of the equation,
in speciﬁcation (4) of Table 4 I include in
the sample higher income families (I no
longer cap family income at $150,000),
and no longer cap tuition at the average
for private four–year colleges. Essentially
I allow the ﬁnancial aid tax rate to climb
all the way up the income distribution
without reverting back to zero. As these
families in fact are not likely to face a
ﬁnancial aid tax on their assets because
their calculated EFC per concurrently
enrolled child exceeds the expected cost
of attendance, one would expect the impact of the tax on family assets to decline
using this speciﬁcation. In fact, the effect
of the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets increases
using this approach. This ﬁnding sug-

child spacing versus the assumed two
year child spacing used above and results
in a slight reduction on the coefﬁcient of
the ﬁnancial aid tax on savings interacted
with income from –0.376 to –0.293. This
translates to a decrease in assets of $4,768
for those with the average characteristics
outlined above.
In order to test the robustness of
Feldstein’s (1995) approach to estimating
the impact of the ﬁnancial aid tax on net
financial assets, I specify the equation
as a simple linear relationship between
net ﬁnancial assets and income, number
of children, age of the older parent, and
the ﬁnancial aid tax (speciﬁcation (3) in
Table 4). Once again the coefﬁcient on
the ﬁnancial aid tax is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that families who face
a higher ﬁnancial aid tax save less. The
estimated impact is that families who face
the average ﬁnancial aid tax, as calculated
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tax, using actual child spacing in each
case, on varying categories of assets. Net
ﬁnancial assets may not be the appropriate
measure of assets in this type of analysis,
as ﬁnancial debt is not included in needs
analysis in determining the asset base;
therefore, the ﬁrst asset base investigated
in Table 5 is ﬁnancial assets (rather than
financial assets net of financial debt).
Financial assets are simply net ﬁnancial
assets as deﬁned above after adding back
ﬁnancial debt. This equation is estimated
using a Tobit regression, as ﬁnancial assets
are censored at zero. The results change
dramatically. The coefficient on the financial aid tax interacted with income
is now a positive .331 and signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level. This suggests that
families who face a higher ﬁnancial aid
tax actually have greater ﬁnancial assets
than those who face a lower ﬁnancial aid
tax. This result, coupled with the ﬁnding
that net ﬁnancial assets are lower for high
tax families suggest either that families
who face a higher ﬁnancial aid tax have
higher ﬁnancial assets and even higher
ﬁnancial debt, or that the results are quite
sensitive to the measurement of assets,
or both.

gests that the result is being determined,
at least in part, by the speciﬁcation of the
relationship between assets, income, and
the ﬁnancial aid tax, and the assumptions
governing the estimation of the expected
ﬁnancial aid tax.
In summary, the estimation approach
and ﬁnancial aid tax calculation followed
by Feldstein (1995), and matched closely
by Kim (1999), applied to the more recent
prospective college students in this data
set leads to results that are qualitatively
similar. Families appear to save less in
terms of net ﬁnancial assets in response
to a higher ﬁnancial aid tax on assets;
however, the magnitudes of the effects are
generally smaller. While Feldstein (1995)
and Kim (1999) ﬁnd effects that suggest a
40 to 60 percent reduction in savings for
the average ﬁnancial aid recipient, I ﬁnd
effects that suggest approximately a 15
percent reduction in savings.9 The results
found here, while not directly comparable
with Dick et al. (2002), are more in line
with the order of magnitude found in
their study.
As a further test of Feldstein’s (1995) approach on more recent cohorts of families
I estimate the impact of his ﬁnancial aid

TABLE 5
REPLICATION OF FELDSTEIN’S FINANCIAL AID RESULTS VITH VARYING ASSET BASE
Net Worth
Financial Assets
Taxable Assets
Intercept
–103,000.26***
–14,165.72*
–41,474.09*
(6,228.81)
(7,995.59)
(22,351.15)
Income

–0.974
(0.672)

0.168
(0.863)

–0.102
(2.41)

Income*Number of Children

0.027
(0.052)

0.065
(0.067)

–0.052
(0.188)

Income*Age of Older Parent

0.065***
(0.014)

0.029
(0.018)

0.085*
(0.051)

Income*Financial Aid Tax

0.331*
–0.029
–0.262
(0.171)
(0.220)
(0.614)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
All three speciﬁcations use Feldstein’s (1995) speciﬁcation with actual child spacing across varying asset bases.
9

It is interesting to note that Long (2002) in an attempt to replicate Feldstein’s (1995) results with the 1986
Survey of Consumer Finances data estimated a coefﬁcient of –.36, and was unable to replicate the –1.4 coefﬁcient found by Feldstein (1995). Long attributes this discrepancy to the tremendous sensitivity of the results
to sample construction, the ﬁnancial aid tax calculation, and speciﬁcation.
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These changes in the estimation of the
expected ﬁnancial aid tax on assets results
in a reduction in the estimated tax on
assets. Speciﬁcally, the Feldstein (1995)
calculation of the ﬁnancial aid tax applied
to these data has a mean tax rate of 28.8
percent, while the Edlin (1993) calculation
of the ﬁnancial aid tax applied to these
data has a mean value of 17.9 percent
(see Appendix B for details of these calculations).
Table 6 examines the impact of the Edlin
(1993) calculated ﬁnancial tax on net ﬁnancial assets under various speciﬁcations in
order to test the sensitivity of the previous
results to the calculation of the ﬁnancial
aid tax and to speciﬁcation of the equation.
Speciﬁcation (1) of Table 6 replicates speciﬁcation (1) of Table 4, and is essentially
a test of the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the assumptions surrounding
the calculation of the expected ﬁnancial
aid tax. The coefﬁcients on the other regressors remain largely unchanged from
the previous speciﬁcation. On the other
hand, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial aid
tax interacted with income decreases
dramatically from –.376 to –0.096, and
is no longer signiﬁcantly different from
zero, at conventional levels. Specification (2) of Table 6 allows the regressors
to enter the regression linearly, rather
than interacted with income. This speciﬁcation is a replication of speciﬁcation
(3) of Table 4, but using the Edlin (1993)
ﬁnancial aid tax calculation. Once again
the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial aid tax is
negative, but it is no longer signiﬁcantly
different from zero. Using the Feldstein
(1995) ﬁnancial aid tax the coefﬁcient on
this tax was –21,744, while under the Edlin
(1993) calculation the coefﬁcient dropped
to –4,653. As an additional test of this
result I include among the regressors the
responding parent’s race and the highest
degree attained by either of the parents.
While the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial aid
tax increases, it still is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero.

Neither ﬁnancial assets nor net ﬁnancial
assets may be accurately measuring the
asset base that is most applicable in needs
analysis. The “taxable assets” captured by
needs analysis includes cash and other
financial assets, and home equity, but
excludes retirement assets and debt. I
include home equity among the taxable
assets even though it is excluded from
the asset base in the federal needs analysis methodology because it is included
among the asset base when applying for
ﬁnancial aid at most private institutions.
One should consider taxable assets in this
analysis as the upper bound asset base
taxed in ﬁnancial aid, and ﬁnancial assets
as the lower bound. When taxable assets
are used as the dependent variable, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial aid tax interacted
with income is negative but negligible in
magnitude and not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. The ﬁnancial aid tax does not
appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on
taxable assets.
Finally, if the exercise is truly to examine the impact of the ﬁnancial aid rules
on family asset accumulation, then the
appropriate measure of savings should
be net worth. In speciﬁcation (3) of Table
5, the dependent variable is net worth.
In this speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient on
the ﬁnancial aid tax interacted with income is once again negative and similar
in magnitude to the results of Table 4,
where the dependent variable was net
ﬁnancial assets. This result translates into
a $4,263 reduction in assets for a family
with $56,500 in income and facing a 28.8
percent ﬁnancial aid tax. This reduction
in savings represents an average decrease
in net worth of approximately 2.8 percent,
although this effect is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero.
Edlin (1993) outlined a calculation of
the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets that incorporated the interaction of the ﬁnancial aid
tax with state and federal taxes and allowed for consideration of subsidized
loans as a component of ﬁnancial aid.
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS USING EDLIN FINANCIAL AID TAX
Dependent Variable = Net Financial Assets
(1)
–27,978.32***
(5,932.27)

(2)
–165,822.97***
(41,733.12)

(3)
–143,483.38***
(41,694.30)

(4)
–42,031.56
(39,213.30)

–1.380**
(0.677)

1.251***
(0.100)

1.100***
(0.109)

1.083***
(0.100)

Number of Children

3,739.13
(2,878.08)

2,858.54
(2,877.03)

375.53
(2,619.23)

Age of Older Parent

2,942.98***
(903.70)

2,653.16***
(900.58)

538.19
(853.37)

Financial Aid Tax

–4,653.57
(13,912.16)

–6,475.49
(13,937.20)

–38,215.51
(28,300.40)

Intercept
Income
Income*Number of Children

0.079
(0.054)

Income*Age of Older Parent

0.056***
(0.014)

Income*Financial Aid Tax

–0.096
(0.226)

30,657.99
(28,840.20)

Financial Aid Tax*Likely to Attend College
Black

–15,386.77*
(7,993.32)

–20,209.61*
(7,424.47)

Asian

8,084.94
(21,217.20)

2,633.22
(17,101.80)

Other Race

–11,391.33
(9,001.32)

–14,150.54
(8,757.48)

–14,040.41*
(8,378.47)

–14,846.57*
(8,086.67)

College Degree

14,663.12**
(6,815.13)

17,790.38***
(6,629.48)

Graduate Degree

18,128.08**
(8,936.87)

15,058.48*
(8,630.67)

Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree

Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.

the responding parent to estimate the
“percent chance” that the child will have
a four–year college degree by age 30.10
Parents and students who responded that
the child had a 50 percent or more chance
of obtaining a four–year college degree by
age 30 (39 percent of the chosen sample)

One of the underlying assumptions of
the previous analyses is that every family
expects their children to attend college.
Of course, this assumption may grossly
overstate the actual expected enrollment
probabilities of families. Fortunately,
the NLSY97 asked both the student and
10

Recall that the NLSY97 is a survey of youth aged 12–16, from which I am using the parent survey. Parents were
asked to estimate the probability that the surveyed child will attend college. I assume in this speciﬁcation that
all of the children in the family have the same probability of attendance.
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home equity. Further complicating the
appropriate calculation of ﬁnancial aid
taxes and their impact is the trend toward
institution–speciﬁc application of needs
analysis, in which individual colleges either slightly or signiﬁcantly alter the needs
analysis formula in an attempt to achieve
institutional objectives. Table 7 examines
the impact of the ﬁnancial aid tax on “taxable assets.” Taxable assets, in this paper,
are deﬁned as cash, checking, stocks, bond,
mutual funds, other ﬁnancial assets, and
home equity. Taxable assets do not include
ﬁnancial debt or retirement assets.
Speciﬁcation (1) of Table 7 is a regression
of taxable assets against income and income
interacted with number of children, age of
the older parent, and the ﬁnancial aid tax.
The coefﬁcient on income interacted with
the ﬁnancial aid tax is positive, but not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Speciﬁcation
(2) of Table 7 allows the regressors to enter
the equation linearly. Again the estimated
impact of the ﬁnancial aid tax on assets
is positive, but not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. Additionally, adding controls
for the parent’s race and educational attainment does not qualitatively alter this
conclusion. The impact of the ﬁnancial
aid tax on assets remains insigniﬁcantly
different from zero. Finally, incorporating
the interaction of the likelihood of attending with the ﬁnancial aid tax, I once again
ﬁnd that those who are more likely to send
their children to college actually save more
in response to a higher ﬁnancial aid tax,
although the effect is not signiﬁcant. These
results suggest that the tax on assets from
college ﬁnancial aid does not appear to
have a signiﬁcant impact on family savings
as measured by taxable assets.
As a final reduced form estimate of
the impact of financial aid on family
savings, I regress various categories of
assets against the number of years that
a family will have children enrolled in
college (ﬁnancial aid tax years). The underlying assumption here is that if there
is an impact of ﬁnancial aid on savings,

were deﬁned as being “likely to attend
college.” This dichotomous probability
variable was interacted with the ﬁnancial
aid tax (speciﬁcation (4), Table 6). One
would expect that if there were a savings
disincentive effect of ﬁnancial aid that
it should be larger for those who have a
higher expected probability of attendance.
In fact, the coefﬁcient on the interaction
of the ﬁnancial aid tax and the likely–to–
obtain–a–college–degree dummy variable
is positive, suggesting that those families
where the expectations of attendance are
highest are more likely to save in response
to higher ﬁnancial aid taxes than those
who do not think their children are likely
to attend college, although this effect is not
signiﬁcant. Similar results emerge when
the likelihood of obtaining a four–year degree, as expressed by both the student and
the parent, is increased to 75 percent, and
again when it is increased to 90 percent.
These results suggest that estimates
of the impact of the ﬁnancial aid tax on
accumulated assets are sensitive to the
calculation of this tax and the assumptions
underlying that calculation.
In Table 7, I turn to testing for the
robustness of these results to changes in
the measurement of the asset base. Earlier
studies on the impact of ﬁnancial aid rules
on assets had an easier time determining
the appropriate asset base and ﬁnancial aid
tax as the federal government and private
institutions usually used the same asset
base and needs analysis methodology, as
outlined above. In 1992, the federal government adopted the Federal Methodology (FM) of allocating federally funded
ﬁnancial aid dollars, which deviates from
the Institutional Methodology (IM) that
most private institutions use to determine
eligibility for institutional ﬁnancial aid
dollars. The ﬁnancial aid tax calculation
is quite similar under both the FM and
the standard IM, but the asset base varies
across these methodologies. In particular,
the FM excludes home equity from the
asset base, while the standard IM includes
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION RESULTS USING EDLIN FINANCIAL AID TAX
Dependent Variable = Taxable Assets
(1)
–14,612.93**
(7,562.73)

(2)
–113,121.66**
(52,994.90)

(3)
–87,242.71*
(52,826.00)

(4)
–19,314.68
(59,356.40)

Income

0.163
(0.863)

1.553***
(0.127)

1.396***
(0.138)

1.614***
(0.151)

Income*Number of Children

0.055
(0.069)

Income*Age of Older Parent

0.029
(0.018)

Income*Financial Aid Tax

0.082
(0.288)

Number of Children

3,848.64
(3,653.39)

2,922.75
(3,643.79)

299.57
(3,962.63)

Age of Older Parent

2,038.06**
(1,147.58)

1,767.35*
(1,141.03)

289.89
(1,291.73)

Financial Aid Tax

7,504.03
(17,632.62)

2,115.48
(17,628.70)

–5,310.03
(42,710.90)

Intercept

23,068.05
(43,530.50)

Financial Aid Tax*Likely to Attend College
Black

–29,351.06***
(10,127.60)

–36,913.49***
(11,236.20)

Asian

3,096.30
(26,882.00)

–20,165.64
(25,886.60)

Other Race

–14,430.89
(11,405.20)

–21,186.90
(13,256.70)

–23,329**
(10,614.90)

–40,282.47***
(12,239.20)

College Degree

19,078.78**
(8,634.30)

17,904.13*
(10,034.80)

Graduate Degree

10,247.19
(11,323.70)

–11,983.94
(13,064.90)

Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree

Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.

Test). The middle–income indicator variable is interacted with the ﬁnancial aid
tax years variable. The results, in Table 8,
indicate that child spacing, in terms of the
number of ﬁnancial aid tax years to which
a family is subjected, does not appear to
have a signiﬁcant effect on net ﬁnancial
assets, for those families who are not likely
to have their assets taxed by ﬁnancial aid,
either because their income is too low (less
than $50,000) or too high (greater than
$100,000). Similarly, even for families for

then families who face a longer window
of ﬁnancial aid, because their children
are further apart in age, will have lower
accumulated assets. This assumption is
only valid if child spacing does not affect
savings directly, and only inﬂuences savings through its impact on the ﬁnancial
aid tax. To test this assumption I create
a dummy variable for “middle–income”
($50,000 to $100,000; recall that for families
with income less than $50,000 the tax on
assets is zero using the Simpliﬁed Needs
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TABLE 8
REDUCED FORM REGRESSION OF THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF TAX YEARS ON ASSETS
Net Financial Assets
Taxable Assets
Net Worth
–149,716.04***
Intercept
–93,540.81
–26,4050.85*
(42,517.49)
(53,910.49)
(15,2315.48)
1.095***
(0.113)

1.387***
(0.144)

3.67***
(0.406)

Number of Children

–1,467.39
(5,663.30)

–1,646.15
(7,180.84)

3,467.6
(20,288.33)

Age of Older Parent

2,709.09***
(906.33)

1,827.10
(1,149.19)

5,183.12
(3,246.86)

Financial Aid Tax Years

1,795.11
(2,109.61)

1,892.04
(2,674.90)

699.83
(7,557.51)

–194.32
(766.01)

220.73
(971.27)

–1,657.86
(2,744.17)

Black

–15,465.09*
(8,048.24)

–29,390.13***
(10,204.84)

–58,908.75**
(28,832.16)

Asian

8,394.84
(21,301.52)

3,385.83
(27,009.47)

–13,871.76
(76,310.96)

Other Race

–11,080.37
(9,035.49)

–14,159.16
(11,456.64)

–15,791.05
(32,368.92)

–13,646.03
(8,430.29)

–22,872.78**
(10,689.27)

–70,937.32**
(30,200.83)

College Degree

14,569.73**
(6,844.41)

18,983.04**
(8,678.43)

4,659.35
(24,519.53)

Graduate Degree

18,008.33**
(8,963.07)

9,882.11
(11,364.82)

Income

No. Tax Years*Middle Income

Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree

–46,769.76
(32,109.49)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.

no signiﬁcant difference in the impact of
child spacing on family assets.11
Because some assets are considered in
calculating ﬁnancial aid while others are
excluded from the asset base, as outlined
above, there may be an incentive for families to reallocate their wealth toward those
assets that are exempt from the asset base
in determining a family’s ﬁnancial aid. To
investigate this possibility I calculated the
ratio of assets that are at least sometimes
excluded from the asset base (home equity
and retirement assets) to total assets (net
worth). This percentage of assets that are
protected from ﬁnancial aid consideration
was regressed on income, number of chil-

which child spacing is likely to have the
largest effect in terms of their ﬁnancial aid
tax on assets there does not appear to be
a signiﬁcant impact of child spacing on
net ﬁnancial assets. Similar results were
found for the impact of the number of ﬁnancial aid tax years on taxable assets and
family net worth. For families that are not
likely to have their assets taxed under the
ﬁnancial aid system, child spacing and,
thus, the number of tax years does not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on asset
accumulation. For those middle–income
families for which the number of ﬁnancial
aid tax years is likely to have a substantial
impact on their ﬁnancial aid tax, there is
11

Similar results were found when middle–income was deﬁned to be from $50,00 to $90,000, $50,000 to $110,000,
$50,000 to $120,000, and even $50,000 to $130,000.
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plausibly exogenous sources of variation in
the marginal tax rates across families, I do
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between
the ﬁnancial aid tax and family savings. At
the very least, this study, like Long (2004),
points out the sensitivity of estimates of
the impact of ﬁnancial aid rules on asset
accumulation to the litany of assumptions
that is necessary to calculate the expected
ﬁnancial aid tax on assets, and to measurement of the appropriate asset base.
If in fact families are not responsive to
the tax on assets imbedded in the ﬁnancial
aid system, it may because they are not
familiar with the arcane calculations that
underlie needs analysis. It may also be
because these arcane calculations tend to
change over time. As outlined above, needs
analysis formulae underwent a signiﬁcant
change with the Higher Education Reauthorization Act of 1992. The Institutional
Methodology of needs analysis changed
dramatically again in 2001. The primary
changes involved the calculation of the
Income Protection Allowance, the Asset
Protection Allowance, and the treatment of
concurrently enrolled students in college.
Under the new IM it is no longer the case
that the family’s contribution per child
was simply the total EFC divided by the
number enrolled in college. Now a family
with two children enrolled is expected to
pay 60 percent of their calculated EFC per
child. In short, while child spacing is still
a signiﬁcant factor in determining how
much a family ultimately pays for college, its effect has been reduced. Whether
families have been inﬂuenced or not by the
more recent developments in ﬁnancial aid
remains an open question.

dren, age of the older parent, and the ﬁnancial aid tax (results are not shown). The
ﬁnancial aid tax did not appear to have a
signiﬁcant impact on the percentage of a
family’s wealth (nor on the log odds ratio)
that was allocated to the assets that are
sometimes excluded from the asset base
in determining ﬁnancial aid.
CONCLUSION
The system of distributing ﬁnancial aid
dollars based on expected family contributions as calculated using needs analysis
formulae implicitly imposes a ﬁnancial
aid tax on assets. As illustrated in Case
and McPherson (1986) and Edlin (1993),
these tax rates can reach quite signiﬁcant
levels if a family has a number of children
and these children are spaced apart in age.
Feldstein (1995) and Kim (1999), and to a
lesser degree Dick et al. (2002), ﬁnd that
these ﬁnancial aid taxes create a signiﬁcant
savings disincentive, such that families facing higher ﬁnancial aid taxes accumulate
less in ﬁnancial assets than comparable
families facing lower ﬁnancial aid taxes.
Kane (1998) and Long (2004), however, do
not ﬁnd convincing evidence that college
ﬁnancial aid inﬂuences family savings.
This paper uses a more recent data set
from 1997 and examines the sensitivity of
the impact of ﬁnancial aid on family savings to the construction of the ﬁnancial aid
tax, the speciﬁcation of the relationship
between assets and familial characteristics, and the measurement of family savings. When replicating Feldstein’s (1995)
results, with the more recent data, I too
ﬁnd that a higher ﬁnancial aid tax reduces
net ﬁnancial assets; however, the impact I
ﬁnd is substantially smaller than the effect
estimated by Feldstein (1995) and Kim
(1999) and more in line with the estimates
of Dick et al. (2002). Additionally, I ﬁnd
that the results are sensitive to alternative
estimates of a family’s ﬁnancial aid tax, and
various measures of family wealth. In fact,
when using other speciﬁcations and more
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Allowance – an Income Protection Allowance =
Parents’ Available Income (AI).
Income Protection Allowance varies by family size and the number of students enrolled
in college.
Employment Expense Allowance equals 35
percent of the lesser earned income for married
parents, to a maximum of $2,800.
CONTRIBUTION FROM PARENTS’ ASSETS:
Financial Assets (including cash, checking, stocks,
bonds, mutual funds) – pension and retirement
assets + an adjusted assessment value for a family
business or farm – an Asset Protection Allowance
= Parents’ Taxable Assets.*
Asset Protection Allowance varies by the age of
the older parent and by marital status.
Parents’ Adjusted Available Income (AAI) =
Parents’ Available Income + .12 × Parents’ Taxable Assets.
PARENTS’ CONTRIBUTION FROM AAI:
AAI
Less than –$3,409
–$3,409 to $10,800
$10,801 to $13,500
$13,501 to $16,200
$16,201 to $19,000
$19,001 to $21,700
$21,701 or more
Parents’ Contribution
–$750
22% of AAI
$2,376 + 25% of AAI over $10,800
$3,051 + 29% of AAI over $13,500
$3,834 + 34% of AAI over $16,200
$4,786 + 40% of AAI over $19,000
$5,866 + 47% of AAI over $21,700

APPENDIX A—NEEDS–ANALYSIS
The following provides a brief description of
the basic framework for assessing the Expected
Family Contribution (EFC) from the parents of
a dependent student.
C O N T R I B U T I O N F R O M PA R E N T S ’
INCOME:
Total Income – actual federal income taxes paid
– estimated state income taxes paid – estimated
social security taxes – an Employment Expense

Financial Aid Award = Cost of Attendance – Parent
Contribution (assuming that all need is fully met
and that the student contribution is zero)
*The data in this paper excludes self–employed
parents and so no adjustments were necessary
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generated by the asset, increases the Available
Income (AI) of the parents, which increases
their contribution from their income, and
decreases their ﬁnancial aid. Second, increases
in the asset base itself, above the Asset Protection Allowance, increase Adjusted Available
Income (AAI), which increases the parents’
contribution from assets, and decreases their
ﬁnancial aid.

for family businesses or farms. Additionally, the
calculation of Taxable Assets is different for the
Federal Methodology (FM), used to determine
eligibility for federal funds, versus the Institutional Methodology (IM) of needs–analysis, used
to allocate institutional funds at most private
institutions, following the 1992 Higher Education Reauthorization Act. In particular, the FM
excludes home equity from taxable assets, while
the standard IM used by most private institutions
includes home equity. This paper includes home
equity in the assets labeled “taxable assets.”

The ﬁnancial aid tax on assets is therefore
1 – (Rtax/Rnotax).*

APPENDIX B—CALCULATING THE
FINANCIAL AID TAX ON ASSETS

This paper assumes a 10 percent nominal return on assets, and the ﬁnancial aid tax rate is
adjusted downward by .83 (again following the
assumption of Edlin (1993)), for EFC exceeding
the maximum 1997 Pell award of $2,700, to
account for the fact that not all ﬁnancial aid is
grant aid and some of the aid comes in the form
of loans, thus as EFC increases some of the lost
ﬁnancial aid is grant aid but some of the lost
aid is loan aid, which must be paid back and
only carries a partial subsidy.

Feldstein (1995) calculation of the ﬁnancial aid
tax on assets:
Financial aid tax on assets = 1 – (1 – ((.12 +
return)*taxrt)) (2x (no. of children) + 2)
Edlin (1993) calculation of the ﬁnancial aid tax
on assets:
The return on an asset, during the college years,
without a ﬁnancial aid tax is

ftaxrt = federal marginal tax rate
staxrt = state tax rate
taxrt = ﬁnancial aid tax
yc = years that the family has a child or children
in college

Rnotax = (1 + return*(1 – ftaxrt – staxrt))yc.
The return on an asset with the ﬁnancial aid
tax is:

*In the Edlin (1993) paper, he actually presents
the tax in terms of a post–college tax on consumption, in which case the tax = (Rnotax/Rtax)
– 1. In this paper, I use the calculation above
which presents the tax as a reduction in the
value of the assets.

Rtax = (1 + return*(1 – ftaxrt)*(1 – taxrt*0.83)
– return * staxrt + return * staxrt * taxrt * 0.83 –
0.12*taxrt*0.83)yc.
The return on an asset with the ﬁnancial aid
tax is reduced for two reasons. First, the after
tax (both federal and state income tax) income

207

